LGBTQ: I continue to stand with you for equal rights


In Curaçao lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons face increased discrimination, especially since Christian churches have escalated their opposition to equal rights for this group. Of all people, you would think that we should know that discrimination, prejudice and bigotry is a deadly poison. Our fight against injustice goes way back to the dark days of slavery, racism and sexism. Yet, the tables have turned. Many who used to be (descendants of) victims of discrimination are now doing the discrimination. I doubt that this was the intention of the likes of Dr. da Costa Gomez, Tula and ‘Damanan di Djarason’.

Last’s week’s Court’s decision that determined that Curaçao is violating the constitution by excluding same-sex couples from marriage gives hope. Fortunately the Courts have shown to care about the constitution which cannot be said for Staten and Fòrti.

Marriage should not be a heterosexual privilege for if we are created equal, then the love we commit to another human being must be equal as well. We must realize however that there will not be a magic day when we wake up to a country without discrimination and prejudice, but it’s a starting point. I stand with you LGBTQ. I will continue to denounce ignorance and the hate from the pulpits every Sunday.

Willemstad, Curaçao

Dignidat i derechi igual pa un i tur. No t’esei mester ta nos ambishon?

Bo antepasadonan algun dékada atras tabatin relashon seksual ku bestia? Nan tabata kanibal, esta kome karni di hende? Ta presisamente esaki a bisa un siglo pasá ku lo pasa si duna hende pretu i hende muhé na Kòrsou derechi igual di voto ku solamente hende hòmber blanku tabatin. J.J. Hamelberg i Frater Radulphus tabata liderá e kampaña seksista i rasista askeroso aki. E strategia tabata bisto: spanta hende ku koi kèns pa no akseptá derechi igual di un i tur. Danki na hende ku kurashi ku a lucha pa derechi di voto universal, awe na urnanan no ta relevante mas si bo ta muhé òf pretu. E lucha tabata difísil, pero hustisia a triumfá riba maldat.

Awe, representantenan di e mesun gruponan ku no tabatin derechi a konsekuensia di nan sekso i koló, ta grita i oponé kontra di derechi igual di LGBTQ pa motibu di preferensia seksual. E mesun grupo ku ta gosa di nan derechi di voto danki na luchadónan den pasado, awe ta ninga otronan di gosa di derechi igual.

Ki diferensia tin entre e rasistanan di siglo pasá i abo ku ta kontra pa e grupo LGBTQ tin derechi igual? Ki diferensia tin entre nan ku a yama hende pretu kanibal ku set pa sèks ku animal i abo ku ta bisa ku derechi igual pa LGBTQ lo kondusí na pedofelia i matrimonio entre hende i mata? Ken bo ta pa skupi odio tokante di supuesto pedofelia ora LGBTQ kasa, mientras abo ta bira kara kobardemente ora pastornan pedofil i ‘gay’ habusá di mucha? Awor ta kuestioná si e hues ta bon na kabes i ke ‘investigá’ si e ta ‘gay’. Manera e habuzadónan den pasado, na ta diskutí e esensia, esta derechi humano pa tur hende irespeksto koló, sekso i preferensia seksual.

Derechi igual pa LGBTQ ta bira un realidat mas lihé ku nos ta kere. Awor, nos por para na e banda korekto di historia i akselerá esaki den nòmber di dignidat i derechi igual. Igualmente nos por oponé, kalumniá, i plama i odio atrobe riba Alameda i laga historia husga nos meskos ku esnan ku a sostené sklabitu i habusu basá riba koló, religion i sekso.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Un tradishon diskriminatorio: bati Huda

Bati Huda ta un tradishon religioso Kristian na vários pais na mundu ku ta tuma lugá rònt di fecha di Pasku di Resurekshon. Un tempu esaki a keda prohibí na Kòrsou, pero e a gana na popularidat atrobe. Orígen di batimentu di Huda ta repudio di esnan ku ta kere ku e apòstel Hudiu, Hudás Iskarot, a traishoná Kristu, i pone ku eventualmente a mat’é. Aki na Kòrsou a prohibí batimentu di Huda algun siglo pasá hustamente pasombra e aktividat aki ta simbolisá deskriminashon religioso i sentimentunan anti-Hudiu.

Batimentu di Huda tabata tuma lugá na vários manera aki. Segun e.o. Pater Brenneker (Theologie van de Straat), tabata popular pa traha algun pòpchi grandi i pone nan sinta na vários kaminda ku un bòter di róm. Hopi biaha ta pone e pòpchi dilanti di kas di un famia Hudiu. Tur hende ku kana pasa por a dal’é un moketa den su kara. Ora solo baha, tabata marcha bou di müsik, kompañá pa alkohòl, kantando kanshonnan kontra di Hudás (‘kantikanan di bati Huda’) i asta tin biaha kontra e religion Hudiu, lastrando e pòpchinan den kayanan pa despues bati’é ainda mas te ora no sobra nada. Normalmente ta sigi un fiesta hopi animá.

Promé ku e aktividat di bati Huda manera Pater Brenneker a deskribí ariba, e tradishon aki a keda prohibí pa algun siglo. Bièrnè Santu 27 mart 1682, manera kustumber a bati Huda den serkania di Bahia Santa Ana. E loke a kousa konsternashon ta ku e Huda a resultá di ta un representashon idéntiko di e Rabino di Hudiunan di Kòrsou. Gobernadó ku ya na vários okashon a atvertí pa intoleransia religioso, a konsiderá lokual a pasa inakseptabel i via dekreto a prohibí tur aktividat di bati Huda. E prohibishon a dura pa algun siglo.

Na 2019 World Jewish Congress a mustra su oposishon pa batimentu di Huda despues di imágennan di batimentu di un pòpchi bistí komo un Hudiu òrtodòks. Esaki a tuma lugá na Polonia. E batidónan, kasi tur Katólikonan, a kita su kabes afó i tira esaki den laman i kima e resto di e kurpa di e pòpchi di imágen Hudiu.

E siguiente pregunta ta surgi serka mi: Si nos komo komunidat no ta tolerá e invento di Hulanda di ‘zwarte pieten’ pasombra e ta deskriminashon flagrante di hende pretu, nos ta keda silensioso pa loke ta trata un tradishon lokal ku ta flagrantemente anti-Hudiu?

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Fuente: Archivo Nashonal, Kerkgeschiedenis Antillen, Pater Brada (1963).

Repudio

Repudiabel loke a bin dilanti e siman aki tokante di maltrato seksual kontra di algun mucha na un skol lokal. Mi ta lamentá loke a pasa i ta spera ku e víktimanan i nan sernan kerí (ku eventual ayudo sikológiko) lo rekuperá di e trouma ku nan a pasa aden. Mi no ta spera ku esnan responsabel pa e malechornan ta pone man riba nan kabes, tumando ehèmpel di Iglesia Katóliko.

Iglesia Katóliko i Obispado di Willemstad awe i den pasado semper a protehá nan pastornan, fraternan i religiosonan ku (t)a abuzá di mucha. Ta konosí ku nan ta pòst e maniaknan aki di parokia pa parokia òf manda nan un di e otro 5 islanan ku ta kai bou di Obispado. Ounke ta konosí ken e abusadornan aki ta, no ta tene nan responsabel. Pakiko Obispado no ta tuma medida, pero ta promé pa persiguí e grupo LGBTQ,, no pa un akto kriminal, sino nan preferensia seksual?

Mester persiguí kriminalmente tur esnan responsabel den nos komunidat pa abuzo kontra mucha, inkluso religiosonan. Ta basta ku hipokresia. Un Ombudsman pa mucha ta un nesesidat. Víktimanan di abuzo seksual hopi biaha nunka ta rekuperá kompletamente i algun ta ripití e aktonan aki, èkstendiendo e kadena di abuzo. T’esei nos ke pa nos pais? Mi no ta spera.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Despues di ‘hack’ ministerio, laboratorio i banko sentral, nos lo lanta fo’i soño?

Resientemente Banko Sentral (CBCS) a bisa di a bira víktima di un atake sibernétiko. Esaki ta un atake riba sistema i retnan di kompiuter ku e meta pa daña, distruí òf hòrta informashon. Banda di CBCS tin mas instansia ku ya a bira víktima. Manera mi a skibi na 2020, ta trata aki di ministerio di Maneho di Gobernashon, Planifikashon i Servisio Públiko ku ta responsabel pa Kranshi, estadístika, archivonan nashonal i Kolegio Elektoral (1). Pero tambe nos laboratorio médiko na múltiple okashon i otro instanshanan a keda ataká. Rònt mundu e víktimanan di atake sibernétiko pa miedu di daño di reputashon, ta keda ketu. CBCS afortunadamente a skohe un otro rumbo.

Atakenan den Karibe ta mas frekuente ku nos ta realisá. Bahamas i Sint Vincent & the Grenadines resientemente a mira kon nan datonan ofishal a keda ataká pa gruponan supuestamente mará na ISIS. Pa komprondé e eskala i gravedat di e problema, lesa Cyber security: Are We Ready in Latin America and the Caribbean? (2) publiká pa Organisation of American States (OAS) i Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Pa kompliká materia, e guera frieu nobo den Karibe entre Merka, Rusia i China (3) ta responsabel pa loke ta keda yamá atake sibernétiko estatal. Estado Chines ta keda sospechá di usa e atakenan aki pa metanan ekonómiko (Road and Belt Initiative) i Rusonan ta mas dirhí riba influensiá prosesonan demokrátiko. Loke mas nos ta mira ta ku ta ataká un sistema, kue informashon i despues di pidi sumanan grandi di plaka ta hala atras.

Hopi di nos bisiñanan a lanta ‘task force’, buska koperashon internashonal pa kombatí ‘hacking’. For di 2017 mi a pidi pa akshon di nos parti(4). Ta di spera ku miembronan di Staten -ku sa ta kla pa yama reunion ora por trese broyo- por bin huntu pa atendé un di e mayo retonan den futuro. Tempu no ta na nos banda.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

(1) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2020/12/16/a-hack-un-ministerio-silensio-i-no-a-tuma-medida/

(2) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2020/01/06/curacao-govt-databases-hacked-a-reality-check/

(3) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2018/12/21/the-new-cold-war-in-the-caribbean/

(4) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2017/05/15/urgent-call-for-cybersecurity-taskforce/

‘Day After’ COHO

Promé ku reunion di Konseho di Minister di Reino ayera, sierto aktornan tabata eufóriko, intoksiká ku adredelina pa bisa Hulanda bai flit ku su COHO. Sigur esnan ku den kampaña a primintí pa bari COHO fo’i mesa, prent Florin bai gol, plan B, aktivá Nashonnan Uní. Awe ta Day After i Fòrti a lanta ku un enorme ‘kater’ tratando di skapa e poko kredibilidat ku e a sobra.

Un kos ta sigur: a keda demostrá dikon nos outonomia ta na peliger (1). Kontrali na tur otro animal (hende ta animal humano), nos no sa di pone esnan mas talentoso na kabes. Ademas, nos no ta karga responsabilidat pero ta preferá hunga víktima i bisa ku “a fòrsa nos” akseptá COHO. Sigun otronan Raad van Advies (RvA) a brua tera ku su konseho sin realisá ku RvA a hasi su trabou normal den e proseso di un Rijkswet. Fòrti no ta realisá ku e a hasi esnan pro-provinsia un gran fabor? Mi tin bergwensa pa loke a pasa, pa èkspreshonnan bou di nivel di Fòrti i Kas di Kòrsou, i pa e silensio di e partido ku lealmente ta sostené tur kos.

Mi prekupashon mayó ta otro kaminda sinembargo. Mi ta duda ku e pakete aki lo yuda nos desaroyá (2). Plaka a dominá, pero no a definí direkshon, metanan di desaroyo, no a establesé ‘benchmarks’ i momentunan di midi. Manera mi a bisa aña pasá i ku awor RvA a konfirmá, e proyekto di reskate no tin nos stèmpel di desaroyo. Ku otro palabra, no tin ‘ownership’. Ademas e proyekto ke operá pa gran parti pafó di nos institutonan propio. Mi por komprondé Den Haag pasombra nos institutonan ta swak. Lokual si mi no ta komprondé ta dikon no tin un komponente fuerte pa drecha i krea kapasidat institushonal pa progresivamente nos hasi lokual COHO lo hasi. Ni e aktornan aktual den Fòrti ni esnan anterior desafortunadamente no a pensa riba e senario ‘kiko awor ora COHO stòp?”. Final di kuenta no ta esei ta desaroyo? No ta esei lo a hasi nos outonomia fuerte?

Willemstad, Kòrsou

(1) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2019/10/24/konta-ku-nos-outonomia/

(2) https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2020/08/28/diskurso-tokante-pakete-knops/

Tribón i bakanan hambrá: dos ‘game changers’

Atministrashon kolonial na 1904 a laga Dr. J. Boeke investigá posibilidatnan di peska na Kòrsou. Boeke ta konstatá ku apesar ku tin hopi (tipo di) piská den nos awanan, Kòrsou ta karesé organisashon i kapasidat pa desaroyá peska*. Den terminologianan ku no ta laga duda e a bisa:”over het algemeen schijnt het moeilijk den neger tot intellectueel samenwerken te brengen”, inkluso:”de overschilligheid, over het algemeen aan het negerras eigen [betekent dat er] slordig en zorgeloos [wordt] gehandeld”.

Ounke a duna Gobernadó e rapòrt, no a tribi mishi ku e rekomendashonnan pa organisá peska lokal. A preferá hinka esfuerso den un proyekto estilo ‘game changer’ na 1938 pa laga Alemannan bin piska i prosesá tribón den nos awanan. A argumentá ku “Alemania mester di piská i su barkunan a kolonisá lamanan tur kaminda”. Tuma nota ku na 1938 Alemania ya a start su akshonnan di guera.

Apesar ku dr. Boeke no a rekomendá piskamentu di tribón, e desaroyadónan a bisa ku awanan entre Florida i Kòrsou tabata esnan ku mas tribón na mundu (lokual no ta bèrdat), sufisiente pa abastesé humanidat. Banda di su karni (ku no tabata gustá aki) tribón lo tabata fuente pa perfume, kosmétika, remedi, zeta i kueru. Pues, empleo i plaka. E proyekto no a konsiderá solamente barku di peska pero tambe avionnan ku for di den laira por a lansa harpún den laman i mata un kantidat di 15 pa 16 tribón tur dia. Alfred Ehrenreich (1882-1931), un Oropeo opseshoná ku tribón tabata e fuente di inspirashon. Kuriosamente Ehrenreich su proyekto mes a bai fayit un dékada promé.

No mester ta un sorpresa ku e proyekto di tribón no a mira lus di dia. Mi ta kurioso pa sa si e titular di Ekonomia ku na 2018 a anunsiá mil baka hambrá for di Colombia a keda inspirá pa e proyekto di tribón, 8 dékada atras. E semehansanan ta palpabel. En todo kaso, historia ta demostrá ku historia ta ripití.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

*Rapport betreffende een voorlopig onderzoek naar de toestand van de visscherij en de industrie van zeeproducten in de Kolonie Curaçao (1907)

Guyana, India and Oil in the Southern Caribbean

I’m sharing a timely and interesting article written by my friend Dr. Scott MacDonald Chief Economist for Smith’s Research and Grading and Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium.

“India is one of the world’s major oil consumers and Guyana is an up-and-coming petro-power. In March 2021, HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd., a joint venture between state-run Hindustan Petroleum Corporation and Mittal Energy Investment, bought India’s first shipment of Guyanese oil. This was followed in July 2021 with India’s top refiner, state-owned Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), buying a second shipment of Guyanese crude. While these purchases are a drop in the bucket of global oil sales, they represent a potential new element in the changing face of geopolitics in the Southern Caribbean and could represent an opportunity for Guyana to broaden its trade and foreign policy partners.

India has since bought more Guyanese oil. However, India’s effort to strike a long-term government-to-government deal was turned down by Guyana in August. The Caribbean country is in the process of selecting a company (through bidding) that will represent it in selling its oil on international markets. This does not rule out ongoing one-off sales and it appears that the two countries could be natural partners.

Why India? The South Asian country is a voracious consumer of imported energy, fueled by several decades of strong economic expansion and relatively meager domestic resources (with the exception of coal). Domestic production meets around 15 percent of total oil consumption. This high level of reliance on imported oil has made the country’s economy highly sensitive to international price swings. This problem has been compounded by India’s traditional sources of oil being in the Middle East, where political risk is an ongoing problem. While Iraq and Saudi Arabia remain India’s largest oil suppliers, U.S. sanctions have greatly reduced the role Iran as a major supplier.

India’s push to diversify brought it to Venezuela. This development began in the early 2000s and has continued through 2021. According to one source, India’s imports of Venezuelan oil in 2019 accounted for 40 percent of the South American country’s crude oil exports, equal to $5.5 billion.  Considering the dire state of the Venezuelan economy, the revenues generated by Indian exports have been critical to regime survival.

There are a number of reasons for closer Indian-Guyanese oil trade. First, in 2020 India was the largest buyer of the Maduro regime’s oil. Over the past few years much of this was done through third parties and efforts were made to remain compliant with U.S. sanctions, but be in.

Second, Venezuela is increasingly a less reliable source of oil. The long years of the Chávez-Maduro regime have resulted in the degradation of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company. According to BP, Venezuela’s oil production in thousands of barrels per day was 3,038 in 2009; in 2019 it had fallen to 918. Venezuela’s oil production is back to 1940s levels. In contrast, Guyana’s oil production is on a strong upward trajectory. According to the U.S. Department of State, at-year end 2020, ExxonMobil (the largest oil company operating in the Caribbean country) reached production of 120 thousand of barrels per day and plans to expand production to 750 thousand barrels of oil per day by 2026.

Beyond the decline of Venezuela’s oil industry, rule of law is tenuous in Caracas, while many basic staples are unavailable, and the regime is heavily implicated in criminal activities. Moreover, over five million Venezuelans have left the country, sparking what is Latin America’s worst refugee crisis.

Third, while Venezuela struggles to be a reliable business partner, Guyana’s oil industry is new, run by Western companies, which have the most up-to-date technology and competent management and worker teams. The Guyanese government is also seeking to maintain a transparent process of selling oil, preferring an open system over striking bilateral deals. Moreover, the government’s efforts to invest the money back into the economy and society are going to help it be a more reliable business partner. And, unlike Venezuela, expatriate Guyanese have returned to their homeland to work. There is no Guyanese refugee crisis.

For Guyana, India represents an opportunity to develop closer relations with a country which is not fully engaged in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry in the Caribbean. Although India has its problems with China, in the Caribbean India’s motivation is non-ideological; it is driven by business and the need to find other non-OPEC sources of oil. For Guyana, carving out a space in the Indian market makes considerable sense, both from a business and political risk point of view.

Fifth, Guyana has more in common with India than it does with either China or the United States. The two countries share having been British colonies as well as a democratic form of government which has had to contend with the ongoing challenges in dealing with multi-ethnic and religious groups.

One other factor to be considered in the development of any Indian-Guyanese oil relationship is that it could set the stage for Suriname to sell its oil to India, which has enough demand to spread around. Suriname’s oil industry is less developed than Guyana’s, but it has had a state-owned oil company up and running for several decades and the oil that is beginning to flow is comparable to Guyana’s. There would even be room for a joint Guyana-Suriname venture, which could strengthen the idea of a neutral geopolitical power like India being engaged in the region.

Looking ahead, India has been a major buyer of Venezuelan crude, but the issues surrounding the Maduro regime are increasingly problematic, showing little chance of any major improvements over the medium term. In contrast, Guyana is emerging as an attractive alternative. For Guyana, gaining Indian market share would diversify its trade partners as well as gaining a closer friend in the broader world that is not wrapped up in the Chinese-American rivalry – at least not in the Caribbean. There remains work to be done to take the Indian-Guyanese relationship up to the next level, but there is a strong logic to it for both countries. And such a development could also benefit Suriname, broadening Southern Caribbean oil’s reach outside of the usual players, such as the United States and China.”

Dr Scott MacDonald

Dolarisashon no ta kura fayonan di gobièrnu

Kada tantu tempu ta saka dolarisashon fo’i lachi i presentá esaki komo un solushon mágiko pa nos problemanan finansiero-ekonómiko.

Na 1985 enfrentanto retonan importante (devaluashon di bolívar, siere di Shell i terminashon di tratado fiskal ku Merka) ta proponé pa eliminá nos moneda i introdusí dòlar Merikano (USD) argumentando: “nos gobernantenan a demostrá di no por atendé responsablemente ku nos asuntunan finansiero-presupuestario”. Fondo Monetario Internashonal ta duna dos konseho negativo.

Na 2008 e idea aki ta bolbe lanta kabes en bista di e krísis mundial ku a afektá nos. Atrobe a papia di no tin konfiansa den nos gobernantenan.

Ademas, kada biaha ku Sint Maarten menasá di dolarisá, Willemstad ta drenta pániko. Ta tempu pa Kòrsou hasi su mes eskohonan basá riba lokual ta kumbini’é. Punto ta ku Willemstad siendo 75% di e union aki, mester tuma posishon.

Mas importante ta ku dolarisashon ta un remedi robes. Ta bèrdat ku nos no a demostrá madures ku nos asuntunan finansiero-presupuestario. Si nos problema ta mal gobernashon, e remedi ta pa drecha gobernashon, maneho i pone hende kalifiká. Dolarisashon no ta solushoná mal maneho. Mal maneho lo keda pero enbes di ANG lo tin USD.

Dolarisashon pa rasonnan makroekonómiko tampoko ta kumbiní. Apesar ku nos moneda ta mará na USD, te ainda nos tin vários instrumento monetario importante na nos disposishon pa influensiá i dirigí nos asuntunan finansiero, ekonómiko i soshal. Ku dolarisashon nos ta entregá tur instrumento outónomo monetario sin ku esaki ta trese benefisionan kompará ku e situashon aktual. Ta kurioso nota ku èksponentenan ku tur dia tin outonomia den nan boka kier entregá maneho monetario outónomo ku adoptashon di USD.

Un èksperto a bisa algun aña pasá: “Bo no ta kita martín di un karpinté ora e no hasi un bon trabou. Bo ta siñé kon usa e martín. Sino, e karpinté lo kue un yabi Ingles i sin konosementu algun, kuminsá daña tur pipa ku e mira.”

Ta tristu ku ketu bai estilo Kompa Nanzi, nos ta kere den konstrukshonnan hada, pero no tin kurashi pa atendé ku nos problemanan berdadero.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Mester bolbe paga pa kada djaka morto pa haña alivio?

Kòrsou, sigun opinionnan ta mas shushi ku nunka i ta pèstá ku djaka. Kontrali na loke algun ta bisa, no ta awor Kòrsou ta shushi, sino tin un mal reputashon pa basta tempu kaba.

Outoridatnan di Kòrsou na komienso di siglo pasá tabata man na kabes debí na kantidat grandi di sushedat, djaka i raton den nos suidat kapital. Sorprendente si ta e medidanan ku gobernantenan a tuma pa remediá e situashon indeseabel i alarmante den Punda, Otrobanda i Pietermaai.

Prokuradó General a publiká na 1908 un anunsio den kua e ta pidi pueblo pasa na Fiskalia ku mas tantu djaka i raton morto posibel. Fiskalia tabata paga un depchi (10 sèn) pa kada djaka morto i dos (2) sèn pa kada raton morto. Pa nos haña un idea, e tempu ei kuater (4) webu di galiña tabata kosta un depchi.

E kampaña tabata un éksito rotundo i a haña publisidat den hinter Reino. Sifranan ta mustra ku durante di e promé siman a entregá 219 djaka i 944 raton. En total a paga 20,000 florin lokual awe ta akivalente na Naf 3 mion. E kampaña a produsí algun shen mil djaka i raton. Tambe a eliminá lugánan di benta shushi ilegal den nos suidat kapital. Punda a resultá di ta e parti mas shushi di nos kapital. Finalmente tabata huma sierto barkunan di bela, prinsipalmente esnan ku tabata trafiká pa Venezuela, lokual a mata kantidat grandi di djaka i raton.  

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Archivo Nashonal; Curaçao van Kolonie tot Autonomie, Dr. Joh. den Hertog; Suriname, Koloniaal Nieuws- en Advertentieblad, 14.7.1908