Fayo garafal ku benta UTS

Lòs for di un kantidat di pregunta relevante tokante di benta di UTS, manera kalidat di servisio despues di benta, unda e plaka a bai presis, mi tin un remarke ku te ainda – na mi konosementu- no a keda hasí. Kon por ta posibel ku e mesun hende ku Fòrti a nombra na kabes di e komishon di privatisashon di UTS tabata tambe presidente di Fair Trade Authority Curaçao (FTAC)?

Dikon e pregunta aki? FTAC ta responsabel pa vigilá pa no tin formamentu di monopolio i kompetensia inhustu den nos pais. Den nos kaso, e mesun Presidente di FTAC a sinta na mesa di un negosashon di benta di UTS ku ta tin tur ingrediente di bai afektá kompetensia den nos telekomunikashon.

Pues for di un komienso tabata vislumbrá ku benta di UTS na Liberty Latin America por kondusí na monopolio indeseabel den nos pais. Pa e sólo echo aki tabata robes di a apuntá e Presidente di FTAC komo Presidente di komishon di privatisashon di UTS. Mester a evitá asta e ‘schijn’ di konflikto di interes i inkompatibilidat di e dos funshonnan aki.

Pakolmo a resultá ku e benta a resultá den práktikanan monopolístiko ku resultado ku kalidat di servisio a bai kompletamente atras.

Konsistentemente mi a protestá kontra di monopolio i areglonan ku ta stroba kompetensia sano. P’esei mi a kita protekshon di merkado i tabata kontentu ku mi a defendé i aprobá den Staten e lei ku a krea FTAC den e periodo 2012-2016.

Bèk na e konflikto di interes ku benta di UTS i FTAC. Nos mester realisá ku ta e tipo di prosedernan ariba menshoná ta mina nos demokrasia, institutonan demokrátiko i outonomia. di nos pais.

Mi ta spera ku Kontrolaria General i Staten i gruponan na fabor di transparensia rápidamente lo wak e asuntu aki promé ku ta CHE òf Den Haag mester hasié òf hala nos atenshon atrobe.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Happy animal day isn’t enough: we must protect animals by law

With my favorite dog, Candra, a Shih Tzu, who passed away almost two years ago.

Animal Day. The thing is that saying “Happy Animal Day” is not enough. Not enough because according to the (lack of) law here, anyone can call himself a veterinary and set up shop to “treat” and operate on animals. You don’t have to be a wizard to understand that this situation has led to the unnecessary death and suffering of many a animal.

Animals need laws to protect their welfare because we are not doing a good job here doing this. Many pet animals don’t get enough food, drinking water or shelter. Let’s remember that pet animals are dependent of us for care and food.

People still have very dangerous animals that do not belong in homes such as crocodiles, piranhas, snakes and other exotic animals. These animals are more than often kept in horrendous circumstances.

The fact of the matter is that there is a draft legislation since 2015 to protect our animals. I worked on this as member of Parliament. Sad is that this legislation -despite many promises- has not been introduced officially in Parliaments since 2016. Hopefully this Animal Day, will finally lead to accepting this important legislation. The animals are counting on us.

Willemstad, Curaçao

Nos union monetario: un sikatris di 10-10-10

Riba preshon di Hulanda ku no tabata konfia Philipsburg ku su mes Banko Sentral, a forma un union monetario entre Kòrsou i Sint Maarten sin fundeshi ekonómiko. Na 2006 mi tabata e úniko mandatario ku a protestá pa hala atenshon na e desishon e asuntu aki ta deskabeyá.

Un union monetario ku tin un banko sentral kompartí (CBCS), semper ta rekerí mekanísmonan pa harmonisá/kordiná sierto maneho makroekonómiko, finansiero i presupuestario. Wak union monetario di EU i esun di Ost Karibe. Ku otro palabra, ora bo ta kompartí un moneda den un union monetario, mester sòru pa kordinashon di maneho ku ta i por influensiá e union i konfiansa den e moneda kompartí. Serka nos, desafiando lógika, no tin kordinashon. Kada dia e dos paisnan aki ta drif mas foi otro. Pakolmo, un biaha pa aña ta tende ku Sint Maarten ke bula afó.

Na yüli 2015, riba mi pregunta, e titular di Finansa ku aktualmente ta direktor finansiero di CBCS a bisa: “[..] e union monetario no ta un prioridat”. Bo no mester ta un èksperto monetario pa realisá ku lokual nos tin ta un bòm di tempu. Sigur ku e preshon di e krísis aktual i miedu pa devaluashon di florin di Antia Hulandes.

Pa kompletá e obra, 10 aña despues di desmantelashon di Antia i 12 aña despues ku a primintí ku “mas pronto posibel despues di desmantelashon lo introdusí un moneda nobo, Caribbean guilder (CMG) pa e union” ainda nos ta usa moneda di un pais ku no ta èksistí mas. Algu nunka bisto. Ningun di e tres presidentenan di CBCS for di 10-10-10 por a splika dikon ainda no ta usa CMG.

E union monetario ta resultado di malmaneho i preferensia pa kosmétika di un fecha “leuk” (10-10-10) i no pa un desmantelashon na drechi. Kòrda p.e. riba lista di negativo di lei i kuerpo di ámtenar “eiland-land”. Esaki tabata un motibu pakiko mi a tuma retiro komo mandatario na 2009.

E siñansa ta ku kambio di struktura estatal no ta solushoná problema. Kapasidat di e hendenan den e struktura ta hasi esei. Sr. “Jossy” Henriquez a atvertí nos esaki den su último diskurso komo Presidente di Koloniale Raad (1938). Tòg ta sigi kere ku kambio di struktura estatal e biaha aki si lo trese plaka i solushon.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

No referendum without a referendum law

The reason why I’ve been writing about a referendum law for the past two years is that we don’t have one.

Groups have been popping up demanding for far-reaching constitutional changes in our country; from having The Netherlands gobble us up as municipality, integrating into the EU as ultra-peripheral region (UPG) or becoming independent. Whilst I don’t take away anyone’s right to fight for constitutional change, it is scary that that this can take place without properly consulting the people via a referendum.

Curaçao currently doesn’t have a legally defined referendum process. In fact, according to our Constitution, changing the Constitution is possible once 2/3 of Parliament agrees. There is no mention of referendum in our Constitution.

Yes, we’ve had two consultative, non-binding referendums before. Both were conducted without a referendum law, including the 2009 referendum on whether to accept the proposed agreement to change constitutional status and dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles which was approved by 51.99% of voters. The fact that no (legal) qualifying majority was ever defined for such an important constitutional change, led to much debate and division on the island.

First, the Constitution should be amended and state that any change of constitutional status must be decided by referendum. 

In a referendum law we need to determine how a referendum may be initiated. Options are: (1) the legislative referendum whereby Parliament refers a measure to the voters for their approval; (2) the popular referendum, a measure that appears on the ballot as a result of a voter petition (conditioned upon a minimum of valid signatures), or (3) both the legislative and the popular referendum.

We need to define the types of referendums. 1. the mandatory referendum i.e. if a proposal passes, the Government or appropriate authority is compelled to implement it: 2. the optional referendum whereby the consequences of the vote may or may not be legally binding or 3. both the mandatory and optional referendum.

This law should also specify per type of referendum: (1) when a referendum is valid, i.e. establish the minimum amount of valid votes; (2) what margins should be upheld for a proposal to pass (simple majority, 2/3 or 3/4 of the votes) and (3) who can cast his/her ballot.

This is by no means a complete blueprint. It’s the beginning of a meaningful conversation.

We need a clear referendum process anchored in our constitution. One that’s transparent, not open to multiple interpretations and certainly not prone to manipulation. We’ve been warned, again.

Willemstad, Curaçao

Emoties staan welslagen van steunpakket in de weg

In verschillende door mij gepubliceerde artikelen* en tijdens een onlangs door de Partido Nashonal di Pueblo georganiseerde debat, heb ik gezegd dat er geen beter alternatief is dan het aanbod van Nederland en dat de Caribische Hervormingsautoriteit (CHE) om die reden niet zomaar moet worden afgewezen. Waar ik nog steeds problemen mee heb, is dat CHE lijkt op een oplossing, gezien door de bril van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (BZK).

Natuurlijk is het waar dat onze financiële huishouding niet in orde is en dat wij jarenlang broodnodige hervormingen, vooral op economisch gebied, vooruitschuiven. De kiezers stemmen daarmee in, want als een partij veranderingen doorvoert, wordt deze bij de volgende verkiezing afgestraft, terwijl diegenen die schreeuwen “no ta bin medida” (er zullen geen maatregelen komen) het vertrouwen winnen van het electoraat.

Maar om terug te komen bij CHE. Wat ik mis is een “ownership” gevoel van het pakket bij ons. Het is tot nu toe eerder een Nederlands pakket.

Wat het meest jammer is, is dat dit pakket weinig zegt over wat er moet gebeuren als CHE over 6 jaar vertrekt. Van duurzaamheid is er weinig in het voorstel te vinden.

In het verlengde hiervan is er ook geen duidelijke ontwikkeling doelstelling in het pakket opgenomen. Als we immers meer weerbaar willen zijn in de toekomst, minder afhankelijk zijn van Den Haag en beter in staat zijn om onze autonome zaken te regelen, schiet dit pakket tekort.

In het eerdergenoemde debat heb ik me afgevraagd waarom ik deze houding van Den Haag opmerkelijk vind en niet terug herken van Nederlandse hulp aan ontwikkelingslanden. Ik ben immers jarenlang werkzaam op het gebied van ontwikkelingssamenwerking voor o.a. de Verenigde Naties. De reden is dat dit Nederlandse pakket komt uit de pen van het BZK dat in principe geen kennis heeft van ontwikkelingssamenwerking, zoals dat wel het geval is bij het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BuZa). Nederlandse ontwikkelingsprojecten in het buitenland hebben een totaal andere invalshoek; ze zijn ontwikkelingsgericht en duurzaam. Deze belangrijke link ontbreekt in het voorstel.

Ik zou Nederland aansporen teneinde het ontwikkelingsaspect in het voorstel op te nemen en de grondslagen daarvoor vast te leggen. Het is noodzakelijk dat BuZa zich ook buigt over het Nederlandse voorstel. Een van de meest belangrijke grondslagen die thans ontbreekt is het opbouwen van institutionele capaciteit bij onze ministeries en belangrijke organen. Het moet ergens in Den Haag duidelijk worden dat het voorstel welke thans op tafel ligt en min of meer via remote-control zal gaan functioneren, geen resultaten zal boeken. Het is deze eigen capaciteit die ons weerbaar zal maken, niet CHE. Ten tweede moeten wij ons in dit project kunnen herkennen. De lijst van projecten die hebben gefaald omdat er geen “ownership” bestond bij diegenen die de hulp ontvangen, is lang. 

Aan beide kanten van de oceaan is tot nu toe emotioneel omgegaan met dit pakket die het welslagen van het project ten behoeve van het welzijn van onze bevolking in de weg zal staan. Dit moeten we zeker niet willen.

Willemstad, Curaçao

*https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2020/07/09/kiko-ami-lo-a-hasi/

Power shifts in the world are already affecting us

Recently I participated in the JCI Willemstad panel discussion Peace is Possible. My intervention was based on power shifts in the world that make peace difficult to attain.

Undeniably power is shifting from the US and Europe to Asia. Horizontal power shifts like these are not new however. We’ve seen power shift from Persia to Alexander the Great, from Greece to Rome and Europe to the US. What’s different this time is that power isn’t moving from one center to another center (or a bipolar US-USSR system). Rather, power is being redistributed among many players. Gone are the days of one superpower as we see alternative power centers building up in China, India and Brazil, among others. 

Totally new is that as the above-mentioned horizontal shifts are taking place, power that traditionally belonged to nation states is moving to a virtual global space. Think of this space as a digital environment in which individuals, groups and organizations interact, shop, create, innovate and design virtually instead of doing this in a physical environment. Internet, satellite communication, data, private information, shoppers, traders, financiers, speculators and designers all now live in a virtual space. 

Before this shift it went without saying that these activities were subjected to local regulations, rules of law, public prosecutors and courts. Yet, in this virtual space this is not the case. People here can act almost without constraint. The problem arrises when justice and courts realize that enforcing claims against those committing infractions come from places where laws differ widely from one to another.  Suddenly we realize that activities worth USD trillions are beyond the reach of Central Banks and Financial Intelligence Units. Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), consumer rights, privacy laws, tax laws among others becomes a major cause of concern for citizens, IPR owners and local governments as they realize that a great deal of power that used be encased by nation-states is now gone. 

This virtual space is also populated by the things national governments have spent great amount of time to regulate or eliminate like hate speech, intolerance, fake news, hacking, stalking, international criminality, terrorism and interference in elections, just to name a few. This trend is being accelerated by the social media platform. It has proven difficult to ensure accountability since users of social media usually consent to terms and conditions of the social media companies which give them a legitimate right to collect, share and use such data.

The migration of power will have consequences for everyone, also Curaçao. We must realize that peace and security is not about having the strongest army, the best police force or finest court system. We’ve seen that even if you are the most powerful nation on earth, nevertheless, those bad people who inhabit that global space can attack your city on a sunny September day.

One of the challenges of our time is to bring rule of law to the virtual global space. In my master’s thesis I argued for a United Nations code of conduct for multinational corporations (see the Swiss journal World Competition June 1991) because unregulated international trade gave multinationals -many with budgets larger than medium-size countries- a free pass to commit many abuses in Third World Countries of which the Nestlé’s Baby Killer Case, was perhaps the most abhorrent. Today the risks associated with globalization go beyond mere codes of conduct.

As a small island we are particularly vulnerable. Our actions are neither confined to itself, nor is it sufficient for us to control our own territory. We may already have or plan to legislate local laws against hate speech, fake news or election meddling, but we’re without defense if those perpetrating these actions operate beyond our shores, in global spaces.

In spite of obvious limited financial and administrative resources we need to actively participate in and pursue treaty-based organizations to ensure that the rule of law governs the relations between States of all sizes. We must realize that we can’t continue to not comply with the World Trade Organization and not ascending to Kyoto Protocol (both are examples of treaty-based platforms).

The most important thing we can do is to find out what we can do with others. Our capacity to network with others will determine how successful we are. We’ll have to do deal with people with whom we do not not always share their values, but with whom, we share common interests. We are now interlocked in a way which has never been the case before. In the past we’d call the Minister of Justice about security issues. Now we’d want to talk to the Minister of Health because of pandemic disease, the Minister of Telecommunication because of a threat of cyber warfare, and the Minister of Governance because of election meddling.

This brings me to the last point. Our government is constructed based on vertical hierarchy and specialization of tasks. This is the wrong type of structure to have. We need to network externally with others, but perhaps more importantly we need to network horizontally within our own government.


Willemstad, Curaçao

#virtualspace, #curacao, #multinationals, #peaceispossible, #jci

Dòktor a lucha pa outonomia, no provinsia


Un persona a aserkámi komo Presidente di Fundashon mr. dr. Moises Frumencio da Costa Gomez (Dòktor) pasombra e a lesa ku a bisa ku Dòktor semper a opta pa nos pais bira parti di teritorio di Hulanda. Mi no sa debatí asuntu sin base, pero sí mi ta korehí e ponensia robes aki pasombra ta trata di Dòktor, nos tata di outonomia.

Pa aparentá ku Dòktor lo a opta semper pa e modelo di provinsia (integrashon den Hulanda) a kopia algun frase di un teksto sin menshoná e fuente. Mi por a saka afó ku a sita for di página 13 di e buki Opdat Wij Niet Vergeten; Gedenkboek mr. dr. Moises da Costa Gomez (1993). Riba e página aki Dòktor ta bisa na 1938: “[..] deelnemen aan het staats- en maatschappelijke leven der grotere culturele eenheid. ln de opneming in de Nederlandse Staat, in het zoveel mogelijk opnemen zijner cultuur [..].  De Groot-Nederlandse gedachte moet voor den Curaçoënaar een levend bezit worden, daaruit moet hij de kracht halen, zijn eigen leven met cultuurgoederen van Groot-Nederland te verrijken en tot ontplooiing te brengen”. 

Laga nos start ku e konsepto Groot-Nederland ku tabata popular promé ku di dos guera mundial na Hulanda. Tabata un inisiativa pa agrupá tur esnan ku ta papia Hulandes i stimulá kultura Hulandes. E idea tabata pa e parti di Bélgika ku ta papia Hulandes i Sur Afrika bira parti di Groot-Nederland. E asuntu di Groot-Nederland no tin ke ber ku bira provinsia di Hulanda pasombra Bélgika ta un pais independiente for di 1830 i Sur Afrika, for di 1930. Ku Dòktor a menshoná e Groot-Nederland tin ke ber ku e parti kultural, manera e mes ta menshoná kontinuamente riba página 13. E no a papia di provinsia, pero manera por lesa riba e mesun página, e ta lamentá ku tin insufisiente “culturele aansluiting aan het moederland”. Ta obvio ora komprondé e konteksto ku no ta trata di provinsia. 

Pa usa esaki komo “prueba” ku Dòktor semper a opta pa provinsia” ta falsifiká historia di nos éroe nashonal. Es mas, den e mesun buki ku ta konsistí di 554 página, Dòktor ta papia den mas o ménos 350 página netamente di outonomia: “Curaçao, rijp voor autonomie”, “Petitie inzake autonomie” i “Curaçao in het Koninkrijk”. Pues no tin nada di integrashon den teritorio Hulandes.

Tin hopi literatura ku ta deskribí Dòktor su ideal pa outonomia. For di “Het Wetgevend Orgaan van Curaçao”, “Curaçao in het Koninkrijk”, “Proeven van een constitutie voor de Nederlandse Antillen” i hinter e proseso di Konferensianan di Mesa Rondó pa yega na outonomia. Ta bale la pena lesa nan. Finalmente lo bo por puntra bo mes kon bin, si Dòktor tabata pro-provinsia, e a lucha for di 1935 te 1954 pa outonomia di kua e tabata e outor intelektual?

Prof. dr. van der Grinten ku a bai skol ku Dòktor i tabata den den e delegashon di Hulanda durante e negosashonnan pa outonomia a bisa di Dòktor: “Zijn leidende gedachte [..] was autonomie van de Nederlandse Antillen als geheel. De banden met het Koninkrijk heeft hij die jaren niet willen verbreken. Een eigen staat [..] was voor hem toekomstmuziek”.

Dòktor na 2013 a keda asigná pa Staten komo Tata di outonomia.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

Stòp nonsense di kome outonomia i bin ku kontenido



Kiko ta fé den Dios, amor di mama, libertat di prensa, derechi di voto, dignidat i e nesesidat universal pa keda balorá komo ser humano? Difísil pa duna un kontesta konkreto. Bèrdat no por kome religion, kompashon, libertat òf rèspèt. Nan no ta kos di kome pero balornan ku nos komo ser humano ta haña nesesario pa hiba un bida felis.

P’esei e asuntu di “bo no por kome outonomia” den un diskushon ku lo mester ta tokante di kon ta drecha kalidat di bida di nos poblashon i alsa kalidat di gobernashon ta un diskushon inútil ku no tin balor agregá. Por sierto e tipo di bruamente di tera aki no ta deskonosí. E ta un ehèmpel palpabel di gruponan ku ke imponé nan boluntat riba otro, hasiendo maluso di nesesidatnan básiko (manera hamber i pobresa) di otronan. Literatura manera New Perspectives on Slavery and Emancipation ta mustra kon doñonan di katibu tabata kombensí ku trabou pa e katibu ta mas importante ku su libertat. Den añanan 60 na sur di Merka esnan na poder tabata enfatisá ku derechinan sivíl pa e Merikanonan pretu no tabatin prioridat. Na Kòrsou tambe a kuestioná e meta ku derechi di voto universal i eliminashon di diskriminashon institushonalisá kontra di hende muhé, ta sirbi.

Lokual nos no mester den e situashon krítiko aktual ta diskutí ku por kome outonomia si òf no. Simplemente e no tin un balor agregá, ni pa e grupo ku ke mantené outonomia, ni pa esnan ku ke entregá outonomia. Ami lo konsehá esnan pro-outonomia splika ki kaminda nan ta bai kana pa nos manehá nos tareanan outónomo mihó ku tabata e kaso te ainda. Esnan ku ta bende e modelo di Boneiru, munisipio di Hulanda òf parti di Union Oropeo (EU) via UPG, mester sali i splika ku kontenido kon nan ta bai hasi esei. Splika kon leu ta ku Hulanda i kiko e kondishonnan ta. Ya tin un bista (preliminar) pa e kaso di Kòrsou? Meskos ta konta pa UPG. Kon ta bai negoshá ku e 28 paisnan den EU pa haña ‘uitzonderingen’ ora bira UPG? Ku UPG lo mester bin euro, pero kiko esaki kiermen pa nos ekonomia ku ta den e zona di US dollar? Kiko ta e konsekuensianan di UPG pa e.o. sektornan di finansiero internashonal, refineria i peska? Òf ta despues ku basha firma pa bira UPG/munisipio ta bai wak kiko ta kiko?

Ta hopi kurioso ku te ainda a skohe pa no bai den kontenido, pero pa un diskushon sin pia sin kabes. Òf no ta dje straño ei ‘after all’ mirando ku ‘cueste lo que cueste’ ke yega na poder na mart 2021? Lo no ta promé biaha. Nos sa di pasado ku ora bo no por splika ku kontenido, ta stroi plaka pa konfundí e masa.

Willemstad, Kòrsou

What do we want from China?


On 12th May, 2017 the outgoing Prime Minister of Curaçao left for Beijing for a presentation about a USD 250 billion Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative for the Caribbean. When he returned, he said that Curaçao should quickly seal the deal with the Chinese State Owned Guandong Zhenrong (GZE) [1] which had promised USD billions in 2016 to rebuild the Isla refinery. Of course we now know that we were played by a bankrupt GZE which had never before built a refinery [2]. He also announced that China had promised that Curaçao would become a hub for the financing of the Caribbean-wide Chinese initiative. No one ever questioned why China would do this since Curaçao doesn’t have a Double Taxation Agreement with China making it impossible to compete with Barbados and Jamaica that do. Curiously, more questions regarding this Beijing trip were asked by The Hague than Willemstad. It’s important that we ask ourselves what we want with China. Fòrti has recently signed many a MoU with Beijing hoping for that silver bullet that will solve our problems without any need for structural reforms. These MoUs have amounted to nothing however. Turns out it doesn’t pay not having a strategy. 

Let’s start with what China wants. While a clear answer still eludes us, there are a few main takeaways. China has positioned itself as anti-colonist even though Beijing’s imperialistic moves in Hong Kong and South China Sea, land grabbing in India and unwanted meddling with Tibetan Buddhism, are hardly unnoticeable. It rarely interferes in internal affairs (unless it involves Chinese interests, see the 2011 Zambian elections), it doesn’t question poor governance, human rights violations or the country’s indebtedness before lending to money-hungry governments. It’s not surprising that some local politicians see China as the best game in town these days, and a veritable alternative to The Hague’s insistence on good governance and sustainable financial management as pre-conditions for financial assistance.

There should be no doubt that China is establishing itself as a formidable player in our region. To be honest, not all of this is due to careful planning by Beijing, but a result of disengagement by the US and Europe which has driven many Caribbean countries into the arms of China especially now that Beijing is filling the void left behind by the US on climate change. To reverse this trend, the region needs to trust Washington again.

China always prefers a longterm view when it comes to geopolitical strategy. At the end, the most important policy goal is to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [3] which in 2021 will mark its 100th anniversary. Beijing’s strategy in the Caribbean so far has been trade, loans and investments even though the Caribbean as a whole only represents 0.017% of all imports to China [4]. Tourism is an area of particular interest for China and we’ll likely see more investments in tourist facilities as is the case on Sint Maarten and The Bahamas. Flights connecting China with the Caribbean are skyrocketing.

China also invests considerably in goodwill to create sympathy, but also as a way to deal with fierce criticism in the Caribbean regarding the preference of Chinese companies to work with Chinese nationals rather than local labor. Recently the Overseas Chinese Association (an organ of the CCP), the Curaçao Chinese Union Foundation and the Curaçao Chinese Business Association (which -privately-  not always agrees with the official Chinese General Consulate’s stance on some issues) have joined forces and generously offered food packages for those in need due to covid-19. The Curaçao Chinese Culture Club has also been very active as well as the Chinese Consulate General which has been involved with aid for reconstruction of schools and Chinese medical technical assistance for Sint Maarten.

Diplomatically China wants to be able to count on China-friendly states in this region for votes in the UN to further boost its global influence and to convince the handful of countries to recognize Beijing and not Taiwan as the sole government of China. Without a doubt China’s presence in the Caribbean serves its global political goals. To many, China is signaling that it can flex its military muscles not only in the South China Sea, the Indian Himalayas and Hong Kong, but on multiple fronts, even in the Caribbean. 

China is patient. China’s presence in this region is not for the moment, but it will likely stick around for the long haul. At the end of the day, China’s main goal in this region is increased economic leverage. Interestly, China doesn’t like to work with regional organizations (such as CARICOM) but prefers bilateral agreements with the different actors. In doing this, China maintains competition among the islands seeking it’s assistance. We should realize that there is no one coherent Chinese strategy for this region, yet. China’s bilateral approach can mean more ‘self-interest’ for both parties. It means however also that small islands with very limited resources are at a disadvantage to negotiate with this Asian giant. Curaçao needs to prepare and debate a good strategy regarding its relationship (of our autonomous responsibilities such as economics, finance, infrastructure) with China. Unfortunately, this almost never happens. 


Willemstad, Curaçao

[1] Press Conference Government of Curaçao, 22 May 2017

[2] https://alexdavidrosaria.blog/2018/11/04/played-by-gze-what-now/

[3] Fault Lines in a Rising Asia (2016), Chung Min Lee (2016)

[4] The Belt and Road Initiative Looks East (2018), The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies 

Ignoransia: “Tanten nos tin florin, plaka no por kaba i nos por sigi paga”



Durante un foro di profeshonalnan siman pasá riba e ‘pakete di Knops’ i e situashon finansiero penoso di nos pais, un panelista a bisa ku nos no mester drenta pániko ku Gobièrnu di Kòrsou (GdK) na un momentu dado no por kumpli ku su kompromisonan finansiero. Esaki pasombra un gobièrnu semper tin instrumènt na su disposishon pa paga. Elaborando e a bisa ku lokual GdK por hasi ta “kap e kabes di Rijkswet Financieel Toezicht (CFT) afó” pa asina e “hasi loke e ke”. Gobièrnu lo por krea sèn i tambe duna hende bòn pa kumpra kos. Su mensahe – ku e a presentá komo alternativa pa e pakete di Knops- tabata: “Si bo tin bo mes florin, sèn no por kaba”. 

Mi a spera ku ningun hende a skucha e ponensia aki. Pero mi a haña entretantu asina tantu komentario, ku mi mester reakshoná pa e fantasia aki no bai biba su mes bida.

Klaro ku den teoria bo por oumentá e kantidat di plaka den sirkulashon pa asina paga bo debenan na florin. Sirkulashon di plaka sinembargo mester ta den relashon ku bo produkshon ekonómiko. Si bo oumentá plaka den bo ekonomia dor di e.o. imprimí biyetenan di florin òf duna bòn (komo remplaso di plaka) sin tene kuenta ku bo produkshon nashonal i sigur den un situashon di dekresementu ekonómiko, bo ta krea problemanan finansiero i sosialekonómiko grandi. Bo ta pone e relashon entre di florin i dòlar Merikano na peliger, bo ta sòru pa inflashon subi bárbaramente, kuentanan di spar den florin na bankonan komersial ta pèrdè balor, konfiansa den florin ta desaparesé i hende no ke keda pagá mas ku e moneda aki i huida di kapital (kapitaalvlucht) lo subi.

Si e medidanan aki ta asina bon, dikon e panelista a bisa ku e promé kos ku mester hasi ta kita kabes di CFT, esta esun ku enkargá ku supervishon finansiero? Mi no ta spekulá riba su agènda, pero mi ke atvertí pa nos no kere den webu di gai. No ta eksistí ningun ‘toverstok’. E reseta ta kononosí. Nos mester reformá nos strukturanan ku ta strobe kresementu duradero, bira mas kompetitivo globalmente, alsa nos kapasidat institushonal i yega na un maneho finansiero duradero. Kon eksaktamente nos ta hasi esaki, mester keda papiá ku Hulanda. E pakete aktual di Hulanda riba mesa no ta hiba nos na e resultadonan ariba menshoná. No mester rechas’é, pero drech’é.

Nos tin un tarea largu i difísil nos dilanti. Lo no ta fásil. Plama speransa falsu dor di krea plaka no ta yuda e kousa. Ta bon pa kòrda kon Zimbabwe no muchu tempu pasá a kana e kaminda di prent plaka pa loko. Ta bon tambe pa kòrda unda Zimbabwe ta pará awe. Ta ei nos ke bai?

Willemstad, Kòrsou